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Abstract 
Using a unique data set for a commercial bank in Albania, we analyze gender differences in loan 
officer performance. Loans screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower 
likelihood to turn problematic than loans handled by male loan officers. This effect cannot be 
explained by borrower or loan officer selection or differences in screening, work load and 
experience. However, while the performance gap always exists for female borrowers, female loan 
officers only gain a performance advantage with male borrowers with experience and do not have 
an advantage with borrowers that are legal entities. We therefore interpret this as suggestive 
evidence for female loan officers’ better capacity to build trust relationships with borrowers.  
 
JEL Classification: G21; J16 
Keywords: Behavioral banking, loan officers; gender; arrears; screening; monitoring 
 
♣Department of Economics and European Banking Center, Tilburg University, and CEPR. 
#Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE), Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). 
*Department of Finance, Accounting, and Real Estate, EBS Business School. 
 
We thank Philip Bond, Reint Gropp, Darren Kisgen, Robert Lensink, Andre Lucas, Andreas Madestam, David 
McKenzie, Harry Schmidt, Frank Song, Frank Yu, an anonymous referee, the editor (Josef Zechner), participants at 
the World Bank Conference on Financial Access in Washington, D.C., the European Economic Association 2009 in 
Barcelona, the 2010 City University of Hong Kong International Conference on Corporate Finance and Financial 
Markets and seminar participants at European Business School, George Washington University, National University 
of Singapore, Tilburg University, Lingnan University in Hong Kong and the European Banking Symposium in 





Does gender matter in banking? We use a unique loan-level data set for a commercial bank in 
Albania over the period 1996 to 2006 to assess the relationship between borrowers’ and loan 
officers’ gender and loan performance. Specifically, we investigate whether male or female loan 
officers experience a lower arrear probability on “their” loans.  
 The recent banking literature has pointed out that incentives of loan officers can have 
strong effects on lending outcomes. For instance, Agarwal and Wang (2009) show that the choice 
of effort made by loan officers depends on the compensation scheme implemented by the bank, 
the information asymmetry between the loan officer and the bank, and the loan officer’s career 
concerns. Hertzberg et al. (2010) show that loan officers are more likely to reveal negative 
information in the case of job rotation because it seems to be better if the loan officer reveals this 
kind of negative information herself instead of having bad information being revealed by a 
successor loan officer. None of these papers, however, has explicitly focused on gender 
differences. 
 The recent finance literature has pointed out that risk aversion, overconfidence and 
mutual trust, dimensions across which men and women are found to differ, impact financial 
decision making and performance. For instance, several studies have shown that women seem to 
be more risk averse than men (e.g. Sunden and Surette, 1998; Agnew et al., 2003).
1
 Others argue 
that men are more overconfident than women (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001; Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). One may hypothesize that such differences should also be reflected in the 
 
1
 Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide an excellent overview over the literature on differences in risk aversion between 
women and men and other reasons for gender differences. 
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relative performance of male and female loan officers. For instance, a higher degree of risk 
aversion of female loan officers may result in loans handled by female loan officers being less 
likely to be in arrears because women grant loans more restrictively. Along the same lines, higher 
overconfidence of male loan officers could result in male loan officers screening and monitoring 
too many loans, eventually leading to an inferior performance compared to female loan officers. 
Another competing hypothesis is that loan officers might have an easier time building a trust 
relationship and exploiting monitoring opportunities with borrowers of their own gender, hence, 
we would expect to find a lower arrear probability of female borrowers if the loan is approved 
and monitored by a female rather than by a male loan officer, with the reverse holding for male 
borrowers. 
 While gender-dependent loan officer performance has not been explored so far
2
, gender 
differences have been analyzed in a variety of other fields in financial economics, such as 
investment decisions, equity analyst performance, corporate financial decisions, corporate boards 
and mutual fund management. The evidence on performance and behavioral differences between 
women and men is mixed in this literature. Barber and Odean (2001) find evidence that female 
investors seem to be less overconfident and, thus, trade less frequently. This leads to a superior 
 
2
 Two recent studies explore whether female borrowers are treated differently by lenders (Alesina et al., 2012; 
Bellucci et al., 2010). The key differences between these two studies and ours are that we investigate performance 
differences associated with loan officer gender and that our data allow for the exact matching between borrowers and 
loan officers. Furthermore, we also have access to loan application data, which enables us to investigate differences 
in borrower selection across loan officer gender. See also Wilson et al. (2007) who explore loan officers’ perceptions 
of female and male business owners. 
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performance of female investors. Levi et al. (2010) show that in the case of female CEOs, the bid 
premium over the pre-announcement target share price is much smaller than compared to M&A 
deals with male counterparts. Kumar (2010) finds that female stock analysts issue more accurate 
forecasts.
3
 Huang and Kisgen (2009) find that acquisitions made by female CFO firms have 
significantly higher announcement returns and argue that women appear to undertake greater 
scrutiny and exhibit less hubris in acquisition decisions. Additionally, female CFOs issue debt 
less frequently, and debt and equity issuances are associated with higher announcement returns. 
There is also evidence for close cooperation between female directors and executives if both are 
in a minority position (Matsa and Miller, 2011). Finally, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that 
female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In particular, 




 This paper tests the hypothesis that female and male loan officers perform differently, 
which is important for researchers and practitioners alike. First, it adds to the existing literature 
on differences between women and men in financial decision making, helping to shed more light 
on whether and along which dimensions female and male decision makers differ. Second, our 
results also shed light on gender differences in loan officer performance, with repercussions for 
 
3
 On the other hand, Green et al. (2009) analyze the performance of male versus female Wall Street equity analysts 
and document that male analysts seem to have better forecasting abilities, i.e. women seem to perform worse at hard, 
quantifiable tasks. 
4
 Ahern and Dittmar (2012), however, show that a substantial increase in female board participation due to a political 
mandate can have negative repercussions for firm performance.  
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the organization of borrower screening and monitoring processes. 
 For our analyses, we use a unique loan-level data set including more than 31,000 loan 
applications provided by a commercial bank in Albania serving individual borrowers, small and 
medium-sized enterprises and microenterprises. For each loan, we can identify the loan officer 
who screened the borrower and subsequently monitored her over the lifetime of the loan. If a 
borrower experiences payment difficulties, this can thus be directly linked to a specific loan 
officer. The data set also includes extensive information about borrower characteristics such as 
the gender or the marital status of the borrower but also asset size, profits and leverage of her 
enterprise, information about loan characteristics such as size, maturity and interest rate of the 
loan, and loan officer characteristics such as gender and experience within the institution. One 
particularly advantageous feature of our data set is that it comprises information on rejected 
applicants, which enables us to explicitly test for sample selection and screening differences 
between female and male loan officers. Crucially, we show that the assignment of applicants to 
loan officers is independent of the gender of the applicant or the gender of the loan officer. This 
random component in the data allows us to formally test and rule out that the borrower pools are 
different across loan officer gender. To test the robustness of our findings and to demonstrate that 
our results hold beyond the case of Albania, we run the analyses using a data set from the same 
bank holding company for Bolivia. 
 We find that loans screened and monitored by female loan officers turn significantly less 
often problematic, that is, they are significantly less often in arrears for more than 30 days than if 
screened and monitored by male loan officers. This result holds for both female and male 
borrowers and is robust to controlling for the borrower’s gender and for the correlation between 
the borrower’s and loan officer’s gender. Besides the statistical significance, the performance 
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advantage of female loan officers is also economically significant, as in our baseline analysis 
female loan officers have arrear probabilities for female and male borrowers which are 4 to 5 
percentage points lower than the arrear probabilities of male loan officers. Our results are robust 
to different sample cuts and alternative performance measures. These findings suggest that not 
only the institutional and governance structure of financial institutions matters, but also the 
gender of the people operating in a given bank structure.
5
 Finding a performance gap across 
gender of loan officers is a novel result in the literature. 
 We also explore possible explanations for this performance advantage of female loan 
officers. First, we cannot find any difference between female and male loan officers in their 
acceptance of applicants. Female loan officers do not grant loans more restrictively compared 
with male loan officers once we control for observable applicant characteristics. Furthermore, we 
find that female loan officers screen loan applications in the same way as male loan officers after 
accounting for unobservable applicant characteristics. Specifically, rejected applicants are equally 
likely to be accepted by male loan officers than by female loan officers in a further loan request if 
screened by a loan officer of a different gender. Second, we do not detect any differences in the 
workload of male vis-à-vis female loan officers. If male loan officers had a significantly higher 
workload, this might be an indication of a higher degree of overconfidence of male loan officers. 
Given our results, this does not seem to be the case. Third, our results do not vary with different 





 See also Berger et al. (2005) and Liberti and Mian (2008) on the importance of financial institutions’ design. 
6
 Experience might be negatively related to loan risk if loan officers gain expertise on screening and monitoring 




 However, we find that female loan officers are not always better than their male 
colleagues, but only under specific conditions, which provide insights into the reason for their 
performance advantage. First, female loan officers always have a performance advantage over 
male loan officers with female borrowers, independent of experience, while they gain a 
performance advantage with male borrowers only with experience. Second, there is no 
performance difference associated with loan officer gender for loans to legal entities (i.e. any 
entity other than a person, such as a partnership or corporation). More specifically, loans to legal 
entities are as likely to have repayment difficulties if screened and monitored by female loan 
officers as if screened and monitored by male loan officers. 
 These findings provide suggestive evidence for the hypothesis that women are better at 
building trust relationships and exploit monitoring possibilities. This explanation is in line with 
experimental evidence by Eckel and Grossman (2001) who conclude that women are more likely 
to reach agreements with women, compared to other combinations.
7
 It also relates directly to the 
findings of Adams and Ferreira (2009) who find results suggesting that the presence of women on 
corporate boards strengthens monitoring. 
 While novel results, our findings are subject to an important caveat. The ideal way to 
establish a causal effect of gender on loan officer performance would be through a randomized 
experiment. Such randomization would have to take place along two dimensions: on the decision 
 
experience in lending and shows that more experienced participants search for significantly more clues in the data 
than inexperienced participants. 
7
 On the other hand, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) find that the presence of female evaluators negatively affects 
the chance of a female job candidate to be hired. 
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to become loan officer and the assignment of applicants to loan officers. While the latter is 
certainly feasible, the former seems impossible to undertake in the real world as one cannot 
randomly choose individuals from the overall population to work as loan officers for a bank. In 
our analysis, we try to establish that our findings are not biased due to the non-experimental 
nature of the data. Unlike in a randomized experiment, however, we are left with the possibility 
that the performance gap between male and female loan officers is driven by unobservable 
borrower characteristics that female loan officers are better in distinguishing. In addition, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that female loan officers differ from their male colleagues along 
time-variant dimensions that we are not able to capture, although we discuss in depth why it is 
unlikely that such differences would drive our results.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background and the data and section 3 the methodology. Section 4 presents our main results and 
several robustness checks. Section 5 explores possible explanations for the performance 
differences between female and male loan officers. We conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
We use a unique loan level data set from a commercial lender serving microenterprises and small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Albania to analyze gender-related loan officer 
performance differences. We obtain all rejected and accepted loan applications by the lender over 
the period January 1996 to December 2006 from four branches of the bank in the Albanian 
capital, Tirana. The lender is part of an international banking group operating in more than a 
dozen countries worldwide. Business, housing improvement, and consumption loans for small 
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and micro entrepreneurs are the dominant loan types in our dataset. To be able to investigate 
performance differences associated with loan officer gender our data set also contains 
information on 203 loan officers. 
 With regard to performance and cost structure, our lender can be compared to small U.S. 
or European commercial banks serving SMEs, both in terms of its financial structure as well as in 
average loan size, adjusted for GNI per capita.
8
 Hence, while our lender operates in a developing 
country, it does standard banking business that is comparable to the business of small commercial 
banks serving SMEs in the U.S. or Europe.  
 In analyzing performance differences between female and male loan officers, we focus on 
the arrear probability of a loan. Specifically, we explore whether loans screened and monitored 
by female loan officers are associated with a different arrear probability than loans screened and 
monitored by male loan officers. Critically, loans are screened and monitored by the same loan 
 
8
 The pre-tax return on equity (RoE) of the lender averaged 17.4 percent over the time period 1997 to 2006. The 
average pre-tax RoE of U.S. commercial banks with less than 1 billion U.S. dollars (USD) in assets included in 
Bankscope averaged 15 percent over a similar time period (1995-2004), the respective pre-tax RoE for European 
commercial banks with assets below 1 billion USD included in Bankscope was 11.6 percent. The lender’s cost-
income ratio (CIR) over the years 2006 to 2008 averaged 71.4 percent, while the CIR of the mentioned U.S. banks 
averaged 73.2 percent between 1995 and 2004, and the CIR of the European banks averaged 80 percent. The lender 
is also comparable to U.S. banks with regard to the average loan size granted. For instance, in 2006 the lender’s 
average loan size was 3,321 USD. If we standardize this figure with the ratio of the Albanian to the U.S. gross 
national income (GNI) per capita for that year, we get an average loan size of approximately 21,300 USD. This 
compares to an average loan size of 28,000 USD for SMEs in the U.S. as reported by the U.S. Small Business 
Association per end of June 2007. 
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officer and arrears are recorded automatically so that the reported arrears cannot be influenced by 
the loan officer. We define arrear probability as the probability that a loan is in arrears for more 
than 30 days at any time over the whole lifetime of the loan. We focus on the 30 day threshold 
because if a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days, the lender automatically increases the 
monitoring intensity, for instance, by calling the borrower in order to learn about the reasons for 
the payment delay. Hence, loans in arrears for more than 30 days are seen as problem loans and 
are subject to a particular treatment, which is associated with additional (monitoring) costs. This, 




 The second reason why we focus on arrear probability as a performance indicator is that 
during the sample period the lender used an incentive scheme based on the arrear probability as 
defined in this study. If a loan officer had fewer loans in arrears for more than 30 days, this would 
increase the loan officer’s salary payment. According to the lender, there are no systematic 
differences with regard to how the incentive scheme is applied across loan officer gender, i.e., 
female loan officers are compensated in the same way as male loan officers. In robustness tests 
below, we use alternative arrear probability definitions of 15 and 60 days. We also use the ratio of 
total repayments to contracted repayments as an alternative performance measure. The results 
remain when this performance measure is used instead of the arrear probability. 
 
9
 Arrear or default frequencies are common in the literature to assess loan officer performance (e.g. Agarwal and 
Wang, 2009). Besides that, default frequencies are also used to assess the performance of rating agencies (e.g. Carty 





2.2 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
We restrict and cut the data in several ways. For the main analysis, we restrict our attention to 
actual borrowers and their arrears and thus drop unsuccessful loan applicants. Second, we focus 
on a set of borrowers that have had only one loan with the bank, for several reasons. The first 
reason is that the database we use is constructed in a way that all socio-demographic borrower 
data are overwritten whenever a new loan application is submitted by a customer that had already 
applied for a loan before. Hence, some of the socio-demographic data we use as control variables 
might not be up to date if we use first loans from borrowers with further subsequent loan 
applications.
10
 The second reason is that the comparison of first (and at the same time last) loan 
applications allows for a consistent comparison because all loan officers have the same limited 
information about the respective borrower at the time of the application. In the case of repeat 
borrowers, loan officers already have historic information, which they can take into consideration 
when granting and monitoring the loan. Focusing on the first loan by each successful loan 
applicant thus allows us to study in a clean way gender-specific loan officer performance 
differences.  
 Third, we drop 16 loans with missing gender information on the loan officer level. For the 
same reason, we exclude loans by borrowers classified as legal entities in the database because in 
these cases we cannot observe the borrowers’ gender information. We will use the sample of 
 
10
 For instance, a certain customer might have applied for a loan in 1996 when she was not married and again in 2000 
when she was married. As the data we use were provided by the lender in January 2007, the database would classify 
that particular customer as being married also in 1996, although in 1996 this was not the case. 
11 
 
legal entities, however, as control sample in our exploration of the mechanisms below. Fourth, we 
drop loans with amounts of less than 100 and more than 100,000 U.S. dollars. While very low 
values might result from false entries in the database we want to exclude very large loans that do 
not fit the definition of small individual, SME or microloans.
11
 In addition, we exclude loans with 
an unreasonable borrower age (younger than 18 or older than 75 years). Finally, we exclude loans 
approved in December 2006 as we cannot observe these loans’ performance. This reduces our 
sample to 6,775 loans granted by 141 loan officers for the baseline regression analysis. Of these 
141 loan officers, 83 (58.9 percent) are female and 58 are male. In robustness tests below, we use 
different cuts of the data. Combining all analyses with different data cuts we use close to 31,000 
loan applications and around 26,500 loans.
12
 
 As robustness test and to show that our results hold beyond the Albanian case, we use 
data from a second subsidiary of the same lender in Bolivia. Specifically, for the baseline 
regression we have data for 7,772 approved borrowers over the years 2004 to 2006, granted by 
195 loan officers, 87 (45.4 percent) of who are female. Unlike in the Albanian case, we do not 
have information on rejected applicants. While presenting the estimations with the Albanian 
 
11
 Regression results are robust to this filter. 
12
 In order to test for any biases that might arise from restricting our sample, we tested for significant differences 
between the original sample and the sample of first and last loans. We find that the fraction of first and last loans 
relative to all loans is, on average,24.4 percent for male and 26.5 percent for female loan officers, the difference, 
however, is not significant. While the share of loans in arrears is almost twice as high for the sample of first and last 
loans compared with the sample of overall loans, there is no significant difference between male and female loan 
officers in this respect. 
12 
 
sample as our main results, where possible we will also present results using the Bolivian sample. 
 
2.3 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
To study performance differences between female and male loan officers, we exploit a random 
component of the dataset, the fact that assignment of first-time applicants to loan officers is 
independent of gender. We were assured by the data providing bank that an assignment of 
applicants to loan officers (or a choice of applicants by loan officers) is mainly based on the 
availability of the loan officers at the time the applicant appears at the bank. However, we 
carefully address the possibility that applicants assigned to female and male loan officers may 
differ with respect to personal, business-related or loan contract-related characteristics. For 
instance, female applicants might be overrepresented in certain business sectors and/or in certain 
regions, i.e., branches of the bank. If female loan officers are (for instance, because of 
specialization) also overrepresented in these business sectors, then the female applicants will have 
a higher likelihood to be matched with female loan officers. An unconditional higher likelihood 
of female applicants to be assigned to female loan officers would therefore not be due to the 
gender of the applicant, but to the business sector they operate in. Hence, to identify a gender-
related performance difference, we test the identifying assumption that an assignment on gender 
does not take place controlling for only a few exogenous factors. 
 To formally test whether this assumption holds, we regress loan officer gender on 
applicant gender using all loan applications of first and last time applicants in Albania. This 
check shows whether female loan applicants are more likely to be matched with female loan 
officers after controlling for observable covariates and additional fixed effects. The covariates, 
which are described in the next section, comprise borrower location, loan destination, year fixed 
13 
 
effects and the interaction of sector and branch fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the Probit 
regression 
 jiijij
DFemaleofficerloanFemale εγβα +++= **
1
    (1) 
where Female loan officerj is a gender dummy taking the value one for female loan officers, 
Femalei is a gender dummy taking the value one for female applicants, and Dij is the vector of 
covariates. The coefficient of interest is β1, showing whether applicant gender is related to loan 
officer gender conditional on the included covariates We cluster the standard errors at the loan 
officer level, thus allowing for unobserved correlation between loans processed and monitored by 
the same loan officer (Froot, 1989). 
 In the first column of Table I, we estimate specification (1) without any covariates, in 
column 2 we include covariates. While the female applicant dummy enters significantly in 
column 1, it turns insignificant once we control for the covariates in column 2. We obtain the 
same result when limiting the sample to only approved loans (column 3) in Albania and when 
using the sample of approved loans for Bolivia (column 4) where we do not have information on 
rejected applicants. In further unreported regressions, available on request, we estimate 
specification (1) for all other sample cuts that are used in this paper. We find that the female 
applicant dummy does not enter significantly in any of them. These results suggest that the 
assignment of loan applicants to loan officers is not based on gender and, hence, validate our 
identifying assumption.  
 
2.4 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We include an array of loan officer, borrower, business and loan characteristics in the arrear 
probability regressions. Table II presents descriptive statistics for these variables for the Albanian 
14 
 
sample, while Appendix Table AI presents them for the Bolivian sample. The descriptive 
statistics in Table II indicate that on average 13.5 percent of all loans in the baseline sample are in 
arrears for more than 30 days. 23.1 percent of the loans in our sample are given to female 
borrowers, while 57.7 percent are approved by female loan officers.
13
 This seemingly high share 
of female loan officers is in line with recent labor market demographics from Albania. 
Specifically, labor market statistics for 2006 reveal that in the groups of technicians, professionals 
and clerks females constitute the majority with 57 percent. Digging deeper, we find that females 
constitute 56.3 percent of clerks and 52.6 percent of professionals, both categories most closely 
corresponding to our loan officers (Statistical Institute of Albania, 2007). Focusing on the gender 
distribution across sectors, a recent census (for 2008) finds that in the financial services sector the 
share of female employees is 52.3 percent.
14
 These numbers are also in line with more recent 
cross-country data from 2009 from the World Bank and the Luxembourg Income Study that show 
that in major economies females are overrepresented in the financial services industry.
15
 
 In addition to the gender of loan officers, we include their age and the number of loan 
 
13
 The share of loans approved and monitored by female loan officers does not vary substantially across the different 
sample cuts that we will use below. 
14
 The census results are available upon request. We also checked the gender distribution for Bolivia. Data from the 
national bureau of statistics in Bolivia indicate that in the category Professionals and Office Workers, the share of 
women over the years 2004-2006 (our sample period in the Bolivian case) is 52.4 percent, thus close to the share of 
women in our sample of loan officers (45.4 percent). 
15
 We use the Gender Key Employment Indicators, which is the result of a joint collaboration between the Gender 
and Development Group of the World Bank and the Luxembourg Income Study. http://www.lisproject.org/key-
figures/key-figures.htm (download as of October 19, 2011). 
15 
 
applications they have processed since they started working for the bank. The 5 to 95 percent 
interval of the age of loan officers in our sample ranges from 21 to 29 years, with an average of 
25 years. On average, loan officers have already processed 223 loan applications. In addition, we 
find considerable heterogeneity in their experience because the 5 to 95 percent interval of already 
processed loans ranges from 11 to 640 loans.  
 Further to controlling for the borrower’s gender, we also control for her civil status, 
employment status (self-employed or – at least partly – employed wage earner) and age. We 
expect female, married and employed borrowers to be less likely to be in arrears for more than 30 
days because of higher opportunity costs and more stable incomes. We also include the number 
of persons in the borrower’s household, whether there is a phone available, and whether the 
borrower lives in or outside Tirana or La Paz. While the availability of a phone might increase the 
ease of monitoring by the loan officers and therewith reduce the arrear probability, there is no 
clear a-priori relationship between household size and arrear probability.
16
 On the other hand we 
expect borrowers living outside of Tirana or La Paz and thus farther away from the nearest 
branch to have a higher arrear probability (DeYoung et al., 2008). 
 Our results show that, on average, borrowers are 39 years old, 75.4 percent of borrowers 
are married, while 87.6 percent are at least partly employed wage earners. On average, there are 
almost five persons in a borrower’s household, there is a phone available in 93.2 percent of 
borrowers’ households, and 79 percent of the borrowers live in Tirana. We find that leverage, 
defined as the total debt over total assets of the borrower at the time of the loan application is 
 
16




relatively low, with 2.1 percent. Borrowers hold on average 9 percent of their assets in cash, total 
assets are 35,000 USD, and monthly business profits 663 USD, indicating the micro-enterprise 
nature of our borrowers. 
 We include the applied loan amount and the applied maturity as loan characteristics in our 
baseline regressions. On average, borrowers apply for 4,212 U.S. dollars and a maturity of close 
to two years. In a robustness test, we instead control for several, potentially endogenous, loan 
characteristics. Specifically, we control for the annualized interest rate, the approved amount and 
the maturity of the loan.
17
 Further, we include the ratio of approved to applied loan amount and 
the type of guarantees/collateral (personal guarantees, mortgage collateral, or chattel collateral) 
provided.
18
 We find an average interest rate of 13.8 percent. The average loan size is 3,729 U.S. 
dollars while the average loan maturity equals to 16 months. On average, borrowers received 88.8 
percent of the amount they applied for.
19
 96.2 percent of all loans were secured with chattel 
collateral, while 12.4 percent of all borrowers provided mortgage collateral and 15.0 percent 
personal guarantees. 
 The use of loan proceeds varies widely, with 26 percent of loans for home improvement, 
11 percent of loans going into working capital, 21 percent to fixed asset purchases, 9 percent for 
 
17
 Some loans in the database mature after 2006. These loans’ maturity was adjusted to December 31, 2006 in order 
to be able to compare the outstanding loans with already matured loans. 
18
 The use of chattel collateral is quite common in countries like Albania and Bolivia as objects from the household 
of a borrower (such as a fridge or a television) often have very high (not necessarily monetary) value for the 
borrowers. 
19




percentile to eliminate outliers. 
17 
 
mixed business (which is a combination of working capital and fixed asset purchases), and 33 
percent for consumption purposes. In terms of sector distribution, we find that 18 percent of loans 
go to entrepreneurs in the construction sector, 9 percent in production, 20 percent in trade, 4 
percent in transportation and 48 percent in other services. 
 The descriptive statistics in Appendix Table A1 indicate partly similar, partly different 
characteristics of our Bolivian sample. Arrears are much higher, with 30.4 percent. Female 
borrowers constitute the slight majority in the Bolivian sample (50.8 percent), while female loan 
officers also constitute almost half of the sample (45.4 percent) and loan officers are younger than 
borrowers, as in the Albanian sample. In addition, applied amounts are lower and applied 
maturities are shorter in Bolivia than in Albania.  
 Interestingly, we further find that loans granted by female loan officers have significantly 
lower arrear rates than loans granted by male loan officers. The average arrear probability of 
female loan officers in Albania is 12 percent. This contrasts to 15.7 percent for male loan 
officers.
20
 If we compare the gender-gender combinations of borrowers and loan officers, we find 
that female loan officers have an average arrear rate for female borrowers of 7.8 compared with 
11.5 percent for male loan officers. For male borrowers, on the other hand, the arrear rate of 
female loan officers is 13.5 percent compared with 16.6 percent for male loan officers. The 
comparisons are similar with respect to the loan officer gender differences in Bolivia, with an 
arrear rate of 24.9 percent and 37.8 percent for female borrowers in the case of female and male 
loan officers, respectively, and arrear probabilities of 22.2 and 34.4 percent for male borrowers. 
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 For the overall sample of loans, without the filters described, these ratios are 8.2 and 6.6 percent for male and 





We use two main baseline specifications to disentangle the relationship between arrear 
probability and the gender of borrowers and loan officers. Specifically, for the first set of results 
we utilize a binary Probit model of the following form: 
iijiijjii DFemaleDofficerloanFemaleFemaleArrear εδγββα +++++= ***** 21         (2)          
where Arreari is a binary variable taking the value 1 if borrower i was in arrears for more than 30 
days once during the lifetime of the loan, Femalei is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
female borrowers, Female loan officerj is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the loan officer j 
serving borrower i is female, Dij is a vector of control variables referring to borrower and loan i 
and officer j, Femalei*Dij is a vector of interaction terms between the gender of borrower i and all 
covariates, and εi is an error term. The covariates are discussed in section 2.4. Consistent with 
equation (1), we include interactions between sector and branch fixed effects to control for 
potential clustering of loan officers or borrowers of a certain gender or ability in a specific sector 
and branch, year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic factors that might affect the arrear 
probability of borrowers, and loan destination fixed effects to control for risk differences 
associated with the loan usage. Results for these additional controls will be omitted from the 
tables. As above, standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level. 
 Given that loan officers may have superior screening or monitoring capabilities for 
borrowers of the same gender, our second set of baseline results utilizes several interaction terms 
















         (3)       
The combination female borrower-male loan officer is the omitted category. The coefficient β1 
thus indicates whether female borrowers are more or less likely to be in arrears for more than 30 
days with a female than with a male loan officer, while the difference between β2 and β3 indicates 
whether male borrowers have a lower arrear probability with a female than with a male loan 
officer. This specification therefore allows us to not only control for the correlation between 
borrower and loan officer gender, but also to distinguish between the performance difference of 
female and male loan officers among borrowers of different genders. 
 
4. Main Results 
This section reports and discusses our main findings, using the two regression models described 
above, and tests the robustness of the results with regard to the use of different samples and 
specifications. In order to draw conclusions about the economic as well as the statistical 
significance of our results, all results we report in this section are marginal effects, that is, the 




4.1 BASELINE REGRESSIONS 
The results in column 1 of Table III suggest that borrowers served by female loan officers are less 
risky. The arrear probability of borrowers served by female loan officers is 4.6 percent lower than 
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 As we are using interaction terms of dummy variables, we compute the marginal effect as the actual change from 
zero to one. 
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the arrear probability of borrowers served by male loan officers across our sample of first (and 
last) loans. This effect is economically significant, given that the average arrear rate in our sample 
is 13.5 percent. 
 Several loan officer, borrower and loan characteristics enter significantly in the column 1 
regression of Table III. First, older borrowers and borrowers served by older loan officers have a 
lower arrear probability. The latter result contradicts the career concern hypothesis by Agarwal 
and Wang (2009), but is in line with Andersson (2004). Second, married borrowers and 
borrowers from households where a phone is available are less likely to be in arrears for more 
than 30 days, suggesting higher opportunity costs for these borrowers. Third, borrowers living 
outside Tirana have a higher arrear probability. Fourth, borrowers with a higher cash-to-assets 
ratio and with higher total assets are less likely to default. Finally, we find that female borrowers 
are less likely to fall into arrears even after interacting all explanatory variables with a female 
borrower dummy, even though this effect is significant only at the 10% level. 
 The results in column 2 of Table III show that the performance advantage of female loan 
officers is robust to controlling for the correlation between loan officer and borrower gender and 
holds for both female and male borrowers. Compared to female borrowers monitored by male 
loan officers, female borrowers monitored by female loan officers have an arrear probability that 
is 4.7 percent lower. Similarly, testing for the difference between male borrowers with female 
loan officers and male borrowers with male loan officers, we find that the arrear probability of 
male borrowers is 5.1 percent lower for female loan officers. Both results are statistically and 
economically highly significant suggesting that, independent of the gender of the borrower, 
female loan officers are better in managing loan risk. Our findings on the different loan officer, 
loan and borrower characteristics are confirmed by this regression. 
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 Columns 3 to 5 of Table III demonstrate the robustness of our results to using an 
alternative arrear probability definition and alternative samples and specifications. First, using the 
60 day arrear definition we confirm our previous finding that female borrowers monitored by 
female loan officers have a lower arrear probability than female borrowers monitored by male 
loan officers, though with a smaller economic effect (that corresponds to the lower arrear 
probability at 60 days of 8.4 percent; see column 3).
22
 The difference in arrear probability 
between male and female loan officers in the case of male borrowers, on the other hand, turns 
insignificant. Second, we do not restrict our attention to the first loans that were at the same time 
the last loans by the borrowers, but we use all first loans available in the database. As in this case 
we cannot be sure that the socio-demographic information did not change after the first loan, we 
exclude all socio-demographic variables from the regression. This less strict cut of the data yields 
a sample containing 14,003 first loans. We confirm our findings of significant differences 
between borrowers assigned to female and male loan officers, both for female and male 
borrowers (column 4). Third, we confirm our findings for the original sample of first and last 
loans and arrear probability of 30 days but including arguably endogenous loan contract terms, 
such as interest rate, the approved amount and maturity, the ratio of approved and applied loan 
amount, and collateral type. Controlling for these loan characteristics, we confirm our finding that 
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 In unreported regressions, available on request, we also use the 15 day cut-off and confirm our findings for both 
male and female borrowers. We also run linear regressions using an outcome measure ranging from 0 to 60 days 
(arrears higher than 60 days are coded as 60) and confirm all results. Looking beyond 60 days of arrears does not 
make sense in our context, as a loan file is transferred to a special unit after 60 days of arrears. We do not have 
information on the gender of those special loan officers.  
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both female and male borrowers have a lower arrear probability when assigned to a female rather 
than male loan officer (column 5). 
 In the analyses above, we measure loan officer performance by using the probability of a 
loan to be in arrears for more than 30 days. A potential issue with this variable is the problem of 
right censoring or truncation. As discussed above, we include loans that were originated in our 
sample period but have not matured before the end of it. This might introduce a certain bias as 
these loans are mechanically less likely to go into default because we cannot observe them over 
their whole life. We run two tests to address the potential bias stemming from measuring loan 
officer performance in this way. First, in column 6 we estimate our baseline regression using only 
4,273 loans that were terminated before the end of our sample period, i.e., December 31, 2006. 
By definition, these loans do not suffer from a truncation problem. As can be seen, the results 
remain for both female and male borrowers. Second, in column 7 we report hazard rates of a Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model that estimates the time to the first payment delay over 30 days. To 
estimate this model we use additional data provided by the bank on actual loan repayments. 
Again, our main findings are confirmed.  
 The column 8 results of Table III, finally, confirm our findings for the Bolivian sample. 
Both female and male borrowers are less likely to fall into arrears if screened and monitored by a 
female than by a male loan officer. The higher economic effects of 14.1 and 10.6 percent can be 





 In unreported robustness tests, available on request, we assess whether our results for Bolivia suffer from 
truncation bias. Specifically, we ran the Table III Columns 6 and 7 specifications for the Bolivian data set and 




4.2 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We next present and discuss the results of a series of additional tests to illustrate the robustness of 
our findings from the baseline regressions. First, we loosen the sample selection criteria and 
confirm our baseline results for different samples. Second, we confirm our findings for an 
alternative performance measure, using expected profitability as performance indicator. Third, we 
discuss the results using the Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-adjusted propensity score matching 
estimator. 
 
4.2.1 Different Samples 
In the first robustness test, we loosen the sample selection that we had chosen for our baseline 
regression. Rather than first loans we use a sample of borrowers’ repeat loans. This allows us a 
robustness test in two directions: on the one hand we expect a less significant relationship 
between the gender of the loan officer and arrear probability because the information 
asymmetries and thus agency problems between bank and borrower should be lower in the case 
of a repeat loan. On the other hand, by testing the robustness of our finding in a sample of repeat 
loans, we assess whether our findings can be explained by female loan officers having to focus on 
first-time borrowers rather than being able to focus on borrowers with an established bank 
relationship. In addition, repeat borrowers have identified themselves as low-risk borrowers and 
there is less variation in arrears to be explained. We also include several control variables that 
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capture a borrower’s loan history with the bank.
24
 Specifically, we control for the duration of the 
lending relationship in years
25
, whether any previous loan application of the borrower has been 
rejected and whether the borrower has ever been in arrears for more than 30 days on any loan 
granted by the lender before applying for a new loan. As in the baseline regression, we first focus 
on a sample of last loans to be able to control for socio-demographic borrower characteristics. 
Cutting the data in this way yields 6,375 repeat loans. Including all repeat loans yields a sample 
of 12,538 loans. In the case of Bolivia, we have a sample of 8,061 repeat last loans and 14,017 
total repeat loans. Note that these samples are entirely different from the sample used in the 
baseline regression as the latter only included first loans. Further note that, to be consistent with 
the results from the baseline regressions in Table III, we focus on the identical set of 141 loan 
officers that we used before in the case of Albania and on the 195 loan officers used before in the 
case of Bolivia. 
 The results in column 1 of Table IV confirm the previous findings and their interpretation 
with a regression using repeat instead of first loans. We continue to find that female borrowers 
screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower arrear probability than if screened 
and monitored by male loan officers, while, on the other hand, there is no significant difference 
for male borrowers anymore. However, even in the case of female borrowers, the economic 
significance is substantially smaller than before, with only 0.8 percent, compared to the 4.7 
percent we found in column 2 of Table III. The results in column 2 of Table IV confirm these 
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 While many borrowers end up with different loan officers in repeat loans, there is no policy of intentional rotation 
at this financial institution. 
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 Results remain unchanged if we use the number of previous loans instead. 
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findings for the larger sample of repeat loans that is not limited to the last loan of each borrower. 
As before, we do not use the socio-demographic borrower characteristics for these regressions. 
The column 2 results show that the performance advantage of female vis-à-vis male loan officers 
is now only 0.9, while it is 1.8 percent for male repeat borrowers. 
 The column 3 and 4 results of Table IV show the same results for the Bolivian sample. In 
both the limited sample of last repeat loans and the broader sample of all repeat loans do we find 
a significant performance advantage of female over male loan officers in terms of arrear 
probability, both for female and male borrowers. As in the case of Albania, however, the 
economic effect is greatly reduced compared to the sample of first loans, with female loan 
officers having a performance advantage of 1.9 to 2.4 percent in the case of female borrowers and 
2.1 to 2.3 percent in the case of male borrowers.
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 Taken together, the results in Table IV suggest that the performance advantage of female 
vis-à-vis male loan officers continues to hold for repeat loans, although in the case of Albania it is 
more pronounced for female borrowers. Critically, however, we find that this effect is smaller 
compared with first loans. 
 We ran additional unreported robustness tests (available on request) to demonstrate that 
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 In unreported regressions, we combine first and subsequent loans by the same borrower and estimate specification 
(3) for the combined sample, including a variable indicating the number of the approved loans by each borrower. In 
the first case, we focus only on the last loans in order to be able to use the socio-demographic data, and in the second 
case we use all approved loans in the sample without including socio-demographic data. For both samples and for 
both Albania and Bolivia, we continue to find that female loan officers have statistically and economically 
significantly lower arrear rates than male loan officers for female as well as for male borrowers. 
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the effect we documented is really driven by loan officer gender. First, we test whether the 
performance advantage of female loan officers is driven by a few top performers. We re-ran the 
Table III column 2 baseline regression using only loans screened and monitored by the two lower 
performance terciles of loan officers, i.e. excluding the top performers. The results are confirmed 
for both female and male borrowers. Second, we drop loans granted by loan officers in their first 
two years at the bank for the Albanian sample to require a minimum level of lending experience. 
Baseline results are very similar for these more experienced loan officers. Third, we exclude 
loans granted in the years 1996 and 1997 from the Albanian sample to exclude the effects of the 
bank’s start-up phase and the pyramid scheme crisis that hit Albania in early 1997. Again, our 
main baseline results remain unchanged for this smaller sample. Fourth, we restrict our sample to 
business loans, i.e. either loans for working capital or fixed assets (or a combination of the two). 
Our baseline results remain unchanged for Albanian and Bolivian business loans. Fifth, we split 
our baseline samples with respect to the approved loan amount and run separate regressions for 
loan sizes above / below the median. The baseline results are very similar for both Albania and 
Bolivia. 
 
4.2.2 Use of an Alternative Performance Measure 
Second, instead of using arrear probability as dependent variable, we employ two alternative 
performance indicators to demonstrate that the performance gap between female and male loan 
officers is not due to the use of a specific performance gauge. Rather than focusing on arrears, 
here we focus on actual repayments. Unfortunately, we do not have recovery rates on defaulted 
loans, but were assured by the bank that these are minimal given the small loan amounts, which 
does not justify going to the courts. As it is not the loan officers screening and monitoring the 
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loans who are responsible for recovery of defaulted loans, we have no reason to believe that these 
small recovery rates vary systematically between male and female loan officers. 
 Specifically, we can distinguish between capital repayments relative to the total loan 
amount (Rec1) and interest plus capital (re)payments relative to the total loan amount plus 
expected interest payment (Rec2). By including interest rates, we can also specifically control for 
the risk-return trade-off of lower interest rates with lower arrear risk. In the case of Albania, the 
ratio of repayments to capital is, on average, 97.7 percent, while the ratio of principal plus interest 
repayments to principal plus expected interest payments is, on average, 97.9 percent. In the case 
of Bolivia, these two ratios are 93.9 and 94.4 percent, respectively. In Table V, we test whether 
the column 2 (8) of Table III results hold for Albanian (Bolivian) borrowers when we use these 
two alternative performance measures. 
 For these tests, we use a Tobit regression because the dependent variables are truncated at 
100 percent. Our samples are somewhat smaller because we do not have repayment information 
for all loans. The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table V confirm our finding of a performance 
advantage of female over male loan officers in Albania for both female and male borrowers. The 
results in columns 3 and 4 confirm our finding of a performance advantage of female over male 
loan officers in Bolivia for both female and male borrowers.
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 In all cases, the total repayments 
are higher for borrowers matched with female loan officers than with male loan officers. 
 
4.2.3 Propensity Score Matching 
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 We also ran the regressions of Table V using only terminated loans to rule out any truncation bias. The results 




Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that borrower assignment to loan officers is 
independent of gender, a formal test for this assumption was provided in section 2.3. In this 
subsection, we nevertheless describe the result of an additional robustness test that takes into 
account concerns that selection based on (observable) borrower characteristics may be a main 
driver of our results. 
 Specifically, we make use of the Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-adjusted propensity 
score matching estimator, which removes any conditional bias that may occur in simple nearest-
neighbor matching estimators (Abadie and Imbens, 2006). We use the same matching variables as 
in column 2 (column 8) of Table III for Albania (Bolivia) to match observations across loan 
officer gender according to observable characteristics. We utilize an exact match with respect to 
the borrower gender to resemble our baseline regression setup of Table III. That way, we estimate 
the average treatment effect independent on borrower gender by comparing female to male loan 
officers for female borrowers and female to male loan officers for male borrowers.
28
 We further 
choose the number of matches according to the simulation results in Abadie and Imbens (2011) 
who find the best matching quality for the number of four matches.  
 We get almost identical results as the ones shown in our baseline regressions in Table III. 
If any, results appear economically and statistically stronger by using the propensity score 
matching. We furthermore investigate the quality of the propensity score matching. While we 
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 Note that we thus do not need to include the covariates*Female interaction terms. Results remain qualitatively 




achieve a reduction in the median of the absolute standardized bias
29
 of around 30 percent for 
Albania, the reduction is even around 70 percent in the case of Bolivia. 
 All in all, the propensity score matching results support our baseline findings that 
borrowers handled by female loan officer are less likely to delay repayment. It also adds further 
credibility to our overall identification strategy.  
 
5. The Gender Performance Gap – Exploring the Mechanisms 
The results reported in the previous section suggest a significant performance advantage of 
female loan officers, though more robust for female borrowers, a distinction we will get back to 
below. This section explores possible mechanisms that can explain this finding. Specifically, we 
test whether female loan officers are better at screening, have a lower workload, are more 
experienced, or are also better with legal entities. 
 
5.1 SCREENING 
The superior performance of female loan officers may be attributable to their better screening 
capacities and/or effort. For instance, if female loan officers are better in screening, then they will 
have a better pool of clients after loan approval. This, in turn, could explain their lower share of 
loans in arrears for more than 30 days. A better screening ability may have two sources. It may be 
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 The standardized bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (unmatched or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). In our case the treated group consists of approved loans handled by female loan 
officers, while the non-treated group consists of approved loans handled by male loan officers. 
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based on observable and on unobservable applicant characteristics (and a combination of the 
two). Alternatively, female loan officers might simply be more restrictive because they are more 
risk averse (e.g. Sunden and Surette, 1998; Agnew et al., 2003). In either case, we would expect 
that female loan officers should be more likely to reject applicants. To test whether differences in 
screening drive our results we use a sample containing both approved and rejected loan 













        (4) 
where Approvali is a dummy variable indicating whether a loan application was approved or not. 
We can run regression (4) only for Albania because we do not have data on rejected applicants 
from Bolivia. 
 We test for screening differences using four different samples. First, we use a sample of 
first and last loan applications with 8,187 loan applicants,
30
 around 93 percent of which were 
accepted. Second, we drop the socio-demographic variables and include all first loan applications, 
yielding a sample of 15,827 loan applications. Third, we use a sample of repeat applicants. Again, 
we run a specification with loan applications that were at the same time last loan applications 
(sample size of 7,590 loan applications) and a specification without this restriction and, thus, 
without socio-demographic applicant characteristics (14,763 loan applications). 
 The results in Table VI suggest that our finding of a superior performance of female vis-
à-vis male loan officers is not driven by differences in screening. We do not find any significant 
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 Here we also include loans approved in December 2006, unlike for the arrears regressions. 
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difference in the likelihood of borrowers to be accepted by female or male loan officers, 
independent of whether the borrower is male or female, except the columns 3 and 4 results where 
we find that female loan officers are (weakly) less likely to accept repeat loan applications of 
male clients. 
 Furthermore, in unreported regressions, we tested for differences across loan officer 
gender using alternative loan contract terms. For instance, it might be argued that female loan 
officers anticipate that their borrowers are less likely to go into arrears and that this is reflected by 
more favorable loan characteristics such as lower interest rates. Specifically, we replaced the 
arrear probability variable with the annualized interest rate, with the approved maturity and the 
share of approved over applied loan amount, all three being direct loan contract terms that are 
decided by the loan officer. We did this for female and male borrowers for both Albania and 
Bolivia. Only in the case of male borrowers in Bolivia there is a significant difference between 
female and male loan officers. In particular, female loan officers grant male borrowers loans with 
shorter maturities than male loan officers. For all other loan outcomes, there are no loan officer 
gender-related differences. We thus find no evidence that female loan officers anticipate the 
lower arrear likelihood of their borrowers. 
 Taken together, these results suggest that female loan officers are not more risk averse in 
their approval decisions based on observable applicant characteristics and also do not seem to 
anticipate that their borrowers go less often into arrears. Moreover, we investigate whether female 
loan officers screen borrowers more diligently by analyzing the time between the loan application 
and the approval decision across loan officer gender. Differences between female and male loan 
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officers are not significant. These results suggest that screening differences between female and 
male loan officers do not seem to drive the performance gap between them.
31
 
 While we do not find any screening differences between female and male loan officers 
based on observable applicant characteristics, it may be that they differ with regard to screening 
based on characteristics that we do not observe in the data. One way to address this is to focus on 
those applicants who were screened by both a female and a male loan officer and analyze whether 
the approval likelihood differs in both cases. This is a stronger test than before where we 
compared different applicants assigned to different loan officers as here we are focusing on the 
same applicant screened by loan officers of different genders. Specifically, we identify all 
applicants screened and rejected by a female loan officer, and subsequently screened by a male 
loan officer (and vice versa) because another loan application was submitted.
32
 We then compare 
the approval likelihood of these applicant groups. The rationale for this test is to analyze whether 
the approval likelihood of the same applicant is different when she is screened by a female 
compared to when she is screened by a male loan officer. For this analysis, a simplifying 
assumption that we make is that neither observable nor unobservable applicant characteristics 
changed between the rejected and the subsequent (rejected or approved) loan application, a 
reasonable assumption given that the median time between the two applications is 240 days. 
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 This result matches the finding by Agarwal and Wang (2009) who do not find any significant difference in 
acceptance decisions between male and female loan officers for a borrower sample from a U.S. bank. 
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 The bank does not have a routine loan officer rotation in place, but borrowers may be served by different loan 
officers in further loan applications because loan officers leave the bank, change the position in the bank, or may be 
absent on the day the borrower submits another application.    
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Besides making this assumption, we control for several variables that may have changed between 
the first and second loan application by the same applicant. For instance, we include the time in 
days between the first and second application, the change in the experience of the loan officer 
between both applications, and the change in the applied amount between the first and the second 
loan application. Concerns regarding the assumption that borrower and loan characteristics could 
change between both applications should be addressed by this. Any differences in the approval 
likelihood should then be driven by unobservable applicant characteristics that are taken into 
account differently by female and male loan officers. 
 Identifying such borrowers yields a sample of 901 loan applications. We find that the 
approval ratio for applicants that were first rejected by a male loan officer, submitted another loan 
application, and were then screened by a female loan officer is 75.1 percent. On the other hand, 
the approval ratio for applicants that were first rejected by a female loan officer, applied again, 
and were subsequently screened by a male loan officer is 79.6 percent. The difference is not 
significant. Running a regression with the approval dummy as dependent variable and the control 
variables we used in the Table VI column 1 screening regression, applicants that are first 
screened and rejected by a female loan officer do not have a significantly higher likelihood to be 
approved by a male loan officer if they apply for another loan than vice versa.
33
 These results 
suggest that female loan officers do not screen loan applications more conservatively after 
accounting for unobservable applicant characteristics. 
 All in all, we find no evidence that female loan officers screen differently than male loan 
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 Results are available on request. We furthermore restrict the sample to only include loan applications for the same 
loan type. The difference of the approval likelihood remains insignificant. 
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officers based on observable and unobservable applicant characteristics. This result suggests that 
different screening techniques are not the mechanism driving the performance differences 
between female and male loan officers. 
 
5.2 DIFFERENCES IN WORKLOAD 
Differences in the workload of female vis-à-vis male loan officers may also explain the superior 
performance of female loan officers we established in section 4. For instance, if male loan 
officers worked significantly more than female loan officers, this might reduce the screening 
and/or monitoring intensity per borrower and, eventually, the performance of male loan officers. 
We may think of two reasons why male loan officers work more than female loan officers. First, 
it may be a decision of the bank to assign more loan applications and therewith, given that the 
approval ratios are not different between male and female loan officers, more borrowers to male 
loan officers. Second, male loan officers may volunteer to handle more loan applications, which 
could be interpreted as sign of a higher degree of overconfidence of male loan officers that was 
previously documented in the literature (e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007). 
 To test for differences in workload between male and female loan officers we first 
calculate the number of loan applications handled by either loan officer type separately for 
different time intervals. For instance, we compare how many loan applications male loan officers 
handled in their first year with the bank with the number of loan applications handled by female 
loan officers in their first year. We then do the comparison for the first two years, three years, etc. 
The time intervals are constructed by using the dates on which the respective loan officer handled 
the first and the last loan application. This allows us to approximate the time the respective loan 
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officer has worked for the bank. We then count the number of loan applications handled over this 
time horizon and do a standard (one-sided) t-test for differences. In the case of Albania, we do 
this separately for all loan applications received, i.e., all screened and monitored loans, as well as 
for all approved loans, i.e., only monitored loans, while in the case of Bolivia, we can only 
analyze approved loans. We focus on the 141 Albanian and 195 Bolivian loan officers included in 
our sample for the baseline regression. In order to measure their workload comprehensively, we 
do not exclude any loan applications or approved loans because of missing data for the 
independent variables. Hence, these tests are based on all loan applications or approved loans 
included in the database. 
 The results in Panel A of Table VII show that, although male loan officers in Albania tend 
to have a slightly higher workload, none of the differences is statistically significant at 
conventional levels and as measured by one-sided t-tests. The results in Panel B suggest that 
female loan officers have a higher workload in Bolivia, though the difference is only marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level for loan officers during their first year. This suggests that the 
performance differences we detected are not driven by female loan officers having fewer 
borrowers to screen and to monitor. 
 
5.3 LOAN OFFICER EXPERIENCE 
We now explore how gender differences in loan officer performance change with experience 
because this may provide some guidance on how gender and experience interact in loan officers’ 
“production function”. For that purpose we add to specification (3) three-way interaction terms 
between the borrower-loan officer interaction dummy of interest and a variable approximating for 
the loan officer’s experience. Specifically, we control for loan officer experience by interacting 
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the borrower-loan officer gender with the number of loan applications the loan officer has already 




















The sign and significance of the coefficient β1,2 indicates whether and how the performance 
advantage of female loan officers varies with their experience. If experience differences drive the 
superior performance of female loan officers, we expect to find a negative and significant triple 
interaction term. Table VIII contains the results of these regressions. We run specification (5) 
both for the Albanian and the Bolivian sample. 
 The column 1 regression of Table VIII shows that in Albania the advantage of female 
loan officers in managing the loan risk of female borrowers is independent of the experience of 
the loan officer. While Female*Female loan officer enters negatively and significantly, the triple 
interaction term with experience of the loan officer does not enter significantly. For male 
borrowers, on the other hand, we find clear evidence for an experience effect. The difference 
between the combination of male borrowers with female and with male loan officers is 
insignificant, but the triple interaction term with loan officer experience is negative and 
significant. This indicates that for low experience levels, there is no performance gap between 
female and male loan officers for male borrowers, but as experience increases, the performance 
gap associated with the combination female loan officer and male borrower vis-à-vis male loan 
officer with male borrower widens. 
 The column 2 regression of Table VIII confirms these findings for the Bolivian sample. 
Specifically, the performance advantage of female loan officers among female borrowers does 
not vary with experience, while the performance advantage of female loan officers among male 
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borrowers is again a function of their experience. 
 In unreported robustness tests (available on request), we also re-ran the column 2 
regression of Table III separately for first-year loan officers, first and second year loan officers 
and first, second and third year loan officers. We find that the performance advantage of female 
loan officers with female borrowers holds for all three subgroups, while the performance 
advantage of female loan officers with male borrowers holds only for the subgroup of all first, 
second and third year loan officers.
34
 
 Summarizing, we find a striking difference between male and female borrowers 
concerning the performance advantage of female loan officers. While female loan officers always 
have a performance advantage among female borrowers, independent of their experience, their 
performance advantage among male borrowers develops over time, with experience. 
 
5.4 DIFFERENCES IN BORROWERS’ LEGAL STATUS 
We finally test whether the female loan officer advantage also holds for legal entities. In the case 
of legal entities, it should be more difficult to establish a trust relationship for the loan officers, as 
legal entities are usually larger, decisions are more complex and usually involve more people. We 
 
34
 These results also offer an indirect test for unobserved loan officer ability: female loan officers should outperform 
their male peers if female loan officers’ abilities were higher when they start working for the bank. One could argue 
that ability would make up for the lack of experience at the beginning. Over time, male loan officers should be able 
to catch up with female loan officers with increasing experience as ability should decline in importance. This, 
however, is not the case. We interpret these results as evidence that unobserved ability is not different between 
female and male loan officers. 
38 
 
thus repeat the Table III column 1 regression for samples of legal entities and contrast the 
findings to the findings for natural entities where the borrower gender can be identified. Again, 
this analysis can only be done for the Albanian sample because we do not have a sufficient 
number of legal entities in the Bolivian dataset.
35
 We do this for three subsamples: all first and at 
the same time last loans, therewith corresponding to our baseline sample, all first loans, and all 
loans. The reason why we also include the latter two subsamples is that the sample size becomes 
very small in the case of legal entities when using only the baseline sample. Also, we cannot use 
the loan officer-borrower gender interaction terms because in the case of legal entities there is no 
borrower gender. Thus, we focus on the loan officer gender dummy. The results are contained in 
Table IX. 
 They show clear differences between the samples of natural and legal entities. The female 
loan officer dummy does not enter significantly in any of the three subsamples containing only 
legal entities, while it enters significantly in all subsamples of natural entities with a negative 
sign. This provides additional support for the hypothesis that female loan officers seem to be 
better than male loan officers because they seem to be better at establishing trust relationships, 
particularly among the female borrowers. This interpretation is obviously subject to the caveat of 
possible measurement bias stemming from the fact that we cannot observe the gender of the loan 
officer’s counterpart and/or owner at the borrowing legal entity. 
 One additional piece of evidence lends support to our suggestive finding that female loan 
officers seem to be better at building trust relationships. In our sample period, there was no 
 
35
 Specifically, we have only 23 legal entities with first loans in our Bolivian sample. 
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mandatory, public credit registry in Albania (this was only introduced in January 2008), while in 
Bolivia there was. As the performance advantage of female loan officers holds in both countries, 
it seems to have less to do with hard information that can be compiled in a credit registry. This 
suggests that other factors seem to play a bigger role, which is consistent with the story that 
female loan officers are better at establishing trust relationships with their clients. 
 All in all, these pieces of evidence suggest that female loan officers do not seem to be 
universally better than their male peers. They seem to do better in situations in which a trust 
relationship can be more easily established and maintained. Such a relationship is easier where 
female loan officers deal with natural persons rather than legal entities and where they deal with 
their own gender. In the case of male borrowers, on the other hand, the experience to build a trust 
relationship has to be acquired over time. This is also consistent with the experience results in 
Table VIII.
36
 In addition, availability of hard information does not seem to drive our results, since 




This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to explicitly consider the role of the gender of 
the lender by analyzing performance differences across loan officer gender. Our main finding is 
 
36
 One more alternative explanation could be that women react stronger to monetary incentives (recall that part of the 
salary of a loan officer at this bank is paid based on the share of loans in arrears), for instance because they have 
more dependent people in their households. In unreported regressions we rule out that loan officer household size or 
civil status explain our findings. 
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that gender indeed seems to matter in banking: female loan officers have statistically and 
economically significantly lower arrear probabilities associated with their borrowers. This novel 
result holds for both female and male borrowers, with the effect being more pronounced for 
female borrowers, and is robust to a series of additional tests. 
 Our analyses also shed light on the mechanisms through which female loan officers are 
more effective in reducing arrear likelihood. First, we do not find evidence that female loan 
officers have better screening abilities, controlling for and based on observable and unobservable 
borrower characteristics. This also suggests that female loan officers are not necessarily more 
risk-averse than their male colleagues. Second, we can rule out that male loan officers work 
significantly more than female loan officers and have, hence, less time to screen and monitor their 
borrowers. Finally, potential differences in experience of female and male loan officers do not 
seem to drive our results for female borrowers, though female loan officers only gain a 
performance advantage with male borrowers as they collect experience.  
 Our results are consistent with female loan officers being better in building trust 
relationships. We offer two pieces of evidence for this. First, female loan officers have always – 
independent of their experience – a performance advantage with female borrowers, while they 
build up this advantage with male borrowers only over time with experience. Second, female loan 
officers have no performance advantage with legal entities where establishing a trust relationship 
is more difficult. This is consistent with experimental evidence that women are more likely to 
agree with women in ultimatum games (Eckel and Grossman, 2001). It is also consistent with the 
results in Adams and Ferreira (2009) that women seem to strengthen monitoring when joining 
corporate boards and shows that in addition to career concerns, compensation schemes and 




 While we show the robustness of our findings for both Albania and Bolivia and our 
baseline findings match other authors’ work for the U.S., we recognize that the results might vary 
across countries with the degree of labor market discrimination against women. A priori, 
however, it is not clear, which direction this would go; on the one hand, women might invest less 
in their human capital in countries with higher degrees of labor market discrimination; on the 
other hand, the few women who can overcome the discriminatory barriers, might excel even 
more.  
 The findings that female loan officers seem to perform better in managing their loans than 
male loan officers gives rise to the question why the bank continues to employ male loan officers. 
This can be explained by the fact that the bank plans to extend more loans to legal entities in the 
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Table I. Test of gender-independent borrower assignment 
This table contains the marginal effects of Probit regressions with the female loan officer dummy (Female loan 
officer) as dependent variable (female = 1). The female borrower dummy (Female) is the main explanatory variable 
(female = 1). In column 1 we regress Female loan officer only on Female. In column 2 we then add sector*bank 
branch interaction terms and additional control variables. The latter include borrower location, loan destination, and 
year fixed effects. See Table II for a description of these covariates. The first two columns use all loan applications, 
while we restrict the sample to first and at the same time last approved loans in the third and fourth column. Standard 
errors are clustered at the loan officer level and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Regression model     
Independent variables I II III IV 
Female 0.1173*** 0.0166 0.0134 0.0056 
  (0.0216) (0.0138) (0.0157) (0.0144) 
          
Sector*Branch fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Additional control variables No Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 8,187 8,187 6,775 7,772 
Country Albania Albania Albania Bolivia 
Type Loan applications Loan applications Approved loans Approved loans 
Sample First & last First & last First & last First & last 
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Table II. Sample characteristics for Albanian borrowers 
This table contains borrower, loan, and loan officer characteristics for 6,775 approved loans from the Albanian lender 
used in the baseline analysis. The table includes the first and last loan for each borrower. We further drop loans with 
unreasonable entries for the borrower’s age (smaller than 18 or larger than 75 years), missing gender information for 
borrower and loan officer, and unreasonable entries for applied loan size (smaller than 100 or larger than 100,000 US 
dollars). The first column provides the means for all loans, while column 2 (3) provides the means for female (male) 
loan officers only. Arrear is a dummy variable indicating whether a borrower was in arrears for more than 30 days at 
least once over the whole lifetime of the loan, Female is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the borrower 
(female = 1), Female loan officer is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the loan officer (female = 1), Loan 
applications per loan officer is a loan officer experience proxy indicating the number of loan applications handled by 
the loan officer until the respective loan was granted, divided by 1,000, Age of loan officer is the age of the loan 
officer at the time the loan was granted measured in years, Age of borrower is the age of the borrower at the time of 
the loan application, Civil status is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower is married (married = 1), Wage 
earner is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower is self-employed or at least partly an employed wage 
earner (wage earner = 1), Number persons household indicates how many persons including the borrower are in the 
household of the borrower, Phone availability is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has a phone or 
not (phone available = 1), and Borrower lives in Tirana is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower lives in 
or outside Tirana (in Tirana = 1). Leverage (total liabilities over total assets), Cash over assets (liquid assets over 
total assets), Total assets (in USD), and Business profits (monthly, in USD) are taken from the borrowers’ financial 
statements. Applied amount is the loan size applied for by the borrower in US dollars while Applied maturity is the 
loan maturity in days the borrower applied for. Interest rate is the annual interest rate charged on the loan, Approved 
amount is the loan size granted in US dollars, Approved maturity is the loan maturity in days adjusted such that no 
loan has a maturity greater than December 31, 2006, Approved share is the ratio of applied amount to approved 
amount, Personal guarantee, Mortgage collateral, and Chattel collateral are all dummy variables indicating whether 
any of the three respective types of guarantees or collateral are pledged by the borrower. Working capital, Fixed 
assets, Mixed business, Home improvements, and Consuming are the loan destinations. The category Mixed business 
is a mix of working capital and fixed asset expenditures. Construction, Production, Other services, Trade, and 
Transport are the borrowers’ business sectors. Branch 1, Branch 2, Branch 3, and Branch 4 denote the borrowers’ 
bank branches. 
 
  Mean | Loan officer gender         
Variable All Female Male SD 5% Median 95% 
Arrear (30 days) 0.135 0.120 0.157 0.342       
Female borrower 0.231 0.270 0.177 0.421       
Loan officer characteristics               
Female loan officer 0.577 1.000 0.000 0.494       
Loan applications per loan officer 0.223 0.226 0.219 0.199 0.011 0.163 0.640 
Age of loan officer 25 24 26 2 21 24 29 
Borrower characteristics               
Age of borrower 39 39 40 11 24 38 58 
Civil status 0.754 0.710 0.813 0.431       
Wage earner 0.876 0.955 0.768 0.329       
Number persons household  4.825 4.655 5.057 1.749 2.000 5.000 8.000 
Phone availability 0.932 0.931 0.932 0.253       
Borrower lives in Tirana 0.790 0.872 0.678 0.407       
Business characteristics               
Leverage 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.152 
Cash over assets 0.090 0.081 0.103 0.135 0.003 0.036 0.385 
Total assets 35.040 37.561 31.603 47.868 2.207 22.371 105.189 
Business profits 0.663 0.667 0.659 0.737 0.000 0.538 1.804 
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(Table II continued) 
  Mean | Loan officer gender         
Variable All Female Male SD 5% Median 95% 
Loan characteristics               
Applied amount 4,212 4,527 3,783 6,284 610 2,872 13,853 
Applied maturity 669 707 617 466 360 540 1,440 
Interest rate 0.138 0.135 0.142 0.028 0.086 0.148 0.167 
Approved amount 3,729 4,083 3,247 5,794 522 2,322 12,381 
Adjusted maturity 488 517 450 264 130 450 933 
Approved share 0.889 0.901 0.873 0.191 0.500 1.000 1.000 
Personal guarantee 0.150 0.163 0.132 0.357       
Mortgage collateral 0.124 0.149 0.090 0.330       
Chattel collateral 0.962 0.951 0.977 0.190       
Loan destinations, sectors and branches            
Working capital 0.109 0.076 0.152 0.311       
Fixed assets 0.213 0.135 0.318 0.409       
Mixed business 0.088 0.035 0.160 0.283       
Home improvements 0.258 0.325 0.167 0.438       
Consuming 0.333 0.428 0.202 0.471       
Construction 0.184 0.211 0.146 0.387       
Production 0.094 0.039 0.170 0.292       
Other services 0.482 0.582 0.347 0.500       
Trade 0.197 0.139 0.275 0.397       
Transport 0.043 0.029 0.062 0.203       
Branch 1 0.405 0.469 0.319 0.491       
Branch 2 0.342 0.319 0.373 0.474       
Branch 3 0.150 0.194 0.089 0.357       
Branch 4 0.103 0.018 0.219 0.304       
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Table III. Arrear probability and loan officer gender – first loans 
This table contains results of the outcome test with the gender of borrowers and loan officers for loans from Albania (models I – VII) and Bolivia (VIII). We present 
marginal effects for Probit models except for model VII, which reports hazard rates from a Cox Proportional Hazards model. The models are based on sub samples of 
approved loans that are at the same time first and last loans per borrower except model IV, which comprises all 14,003 first loans from Albania and except model VI, 
which comprises only terminated first and last loans. For all models except III, the dependent dummy variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for 
more than 30 days at least once over the whole lifetime of her loan (1 if arrears > 30 days, 0 otherwise). Regression model III uses an arrear definition of 60 days. In 
models II to VIII, we interact the borrower and loan officer gender: Female & Female loan officer is a dummy variable indicating the combination of a female 
borrower and a female loan officer, Male & Female loan officer indicates the combination of a male borrower and a female loan officer, Male & Male loan officer 
indicates the combination of a male borrower and a male loan officer. Model V does not use potentially endogenous variables. We also control for loan destinations 
(working capital, fixed assets, mixed purpose, housing improvement, and consumption), year dummies, and business sector by bank branch fixed effects. We 
furthermore include interaction terms for all control variables with the female borrower dummy (Female). Results for these control variables and the interaction 
terms are omitted. The combination Female & Male loan officer serves as the reference group. A Wald test is used to analyze the null hypothesis that the difference 
between Male & Female loan officer and Male & Male loan officer equals zero. The independent variables are as described in Table II. Standard errors are clustered 
at the loan officer level and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Regression model             
Independent variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Female -0.1418*       
      (0.0570)       
    Female loan officer -0.0456***       
      (0.0152)       
   
  
Female & Female loan officer   -0.0466*** -0.0376*** -0.0219** -0.0441*** -0.0661*** -0.6157*** -0.1421*** 
    (0.0144) (0.0071) (0.0097) (0.0137)    (0.0227)    (0.2055)    (0.0331)    
Male & Female loan officer   0.0530 0.0596 0.0966 0.0402    0.0676    2.1119    -0.2754*   
    (0.1947) (0.1471) (0.1191) (0.2204)    (0.3411)    (2.1192)    (0.1046)    
Male & Male loan officer   0.1044 0.0815 0.1488 0.0869    0.1311    2.3303    -0.1695    
    (0.2284) (0.1797) (0.1505) (0.2573)    (0.3874)    (2.1301)    (0.1437)    
Loan applications per loan officer 0.0364 0.0336 -0.0115 0.0185 0.0275    0.0581    0.2945    0.0352    
  (0.0379) (0.0377) (0.0265) (0.0252) (0.0375)    (0.0530)    (0.3447)    (0.0550)    
Age of loan officer -0.0095*** -0.0087*** -0.0032 -0.0060*** -0.0078**  -0.0121**  -0.0454*   -0.0031    
  (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0031)    (0.0055)    (0.0244)    (0.0049)    
Age of borrower -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0019*** -0.0030*** -0.0163*** -0.0029*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)    (0.0006)    (0.0043)    (0.0008)    
Civil status -0.0234** -0.0233** 0.0008   -0.0239**  -0.0180    -0.1307    -0.0774*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0066)   (0.0115)    (0.0178)    (0.1223)    (0.0181)    
Wage earner 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0066   -0.0019    -0.0211    -0.0811    -0.0920*   
  (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0126)   (0.0166)    (0.0299)    (0.2478)    (0.0471)    
Number persons household  -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0030**   -0.0034*   -0.0042    -0.0690*** -0.0013    
  (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0015)   (0.0019)    (0.0033)    (0.0255)    (0.0060)    
Phone availability -0.1024*** -0.1026*** -0.0297**   -0.0945*** -0.1319*** -0.3615*** 
   (0.0372) (0.0371) (0.0146)   (0.0327)    (0.0484)    (0.1377)    
 Borrower lives in Tirana -0.0432*** -0.0433*** -0.0178**   -0.0396*** -0.0514*** -0.1517    
   (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0090)   (0.0134)    (0.0210)    (0.1149)    
 Borrower lives in La Paz         
   
0.0481*   
          
   
(0.0283)    
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  Regression model             
Independent variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Leverage -0.0541 -0.0539 -0.0196 -0.0519 -0.0379    -0.0094    0.2909    -0.1296    
  (0.0542) (0.0541) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0516)    (0.0814)    (0.4741)    (0.2169)    
Cash over assets -0.0857** -0.0853** -0.0397** -0.0291 -0.0712**  -0.1445*** -0.1565    -0.0640**  
  (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0192) (0.0183) (0.0329)    (0.0555)    (0.3115)    (0.0272)    
Total assets -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0001** -0.0002*   -0.0004**  -0.0022*   -0.0008    
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    (0.0002)    (0.0012)    (0.0005)    
Business profits 0.0087 0.0085 0.0059 0.0005 0.0135**  0.0009    0.0033    0.0094    
  (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0066)    (0.0128)    (0.0613)    (0.0286)    
ln(applied amount) 0.0129* 0.0129* 0.0129** 0.0151** 
 
0.0290**  0.1371*   -0.0233**  
  (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0052) (0.0063) 
 
(0.0134)    (0.0700)    (0.0105)    
ln(applied maturity) -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0051 0.0142** 
 
0.0339**  -0.0723    -0.0085    
  (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0081) (0.0062) 
 
(0.0163)    (0.1272)    (0.0081)    
Interest rate         0.7229*** 
             (0.2302)    
   ln(approved amount)         0.0136    
             (0.0095)    
   ln(adjusted maturity)         0.0347*** 
             (0.0132)    
   Approved share         -0.0833*** 
             (0.0253)    
   Personal guarantee         0.0211    
             (0.0149)    
   Mortgage collateral         -0.0308**  
             (0.0139)    
   Chattel collateral         0.0206    
             (0.0229)    
                     
Wald test (for male borrowers)                 
Male & Female loan officer versus                 
Male & Male loan officer   -0.0514*** -0.0219 -0.0522*** -0.0467*** -0.0635** -0.2184** -0.1059*** 
p-value   0.0052 0.1589 0.0030 0.0072 0.0228 0.0445 0.0004 
                  
Observations 6,775 6,775 6,670 14,003 6,775 4,273 6,771 7,772 
Country Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Albania Bolivia 
Regression model Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Hazard Probit 
Sample First&last First&last First&last All first First&last First&last& 
terminated 
First&last First&last 
Problem loan definition 30 days 30 days 60 days 30 days 30 days 30 days 30 days 30 days 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table IV. Arrear probability and loan officer gender – repeat loans 
This table contains the marginal effects of the outcome test for repeat loans using the same set of 141 (195) loan 
officers that were used for the Albanian (Bolivian) borrowers in the baseline regressions in columns 2 and 8 of Table 
III. Probit regression models I and II use Albania data, while models III and IV are based on Bolivian data. Models I 
and III use samples of repeat and at the same time last loans, while models II and IV use all repeat loans. The 
dependent variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more than 30 days at least once over the 
whole lifetime of her loan (1 if arrears > 30 days, 0 otherwise). The independent variables are as in Table IIIplus 
three additional variables capturing the borrower loan history of with the bank: Duration relationship provides the 
number of years since the first loan application of the borrower, Any previous application rejected is a dummy 
variable indicating any previous rejection of a loan application (1 = rejection), Any previous loan in arrears > 30 
days is a dummy variable indicating any previous loan in arrears for more than 30 days (1 = if arrears > 30). Note 
that the variable Any previous application rejected is not available in columns 3 and 4 because rejected loan 
applications are not available for Bolivia. Results for the additional control variables and the interaction terms are 
omitted. The combination Female & Male loan officer serves as the reference group. A Wald test is used to analyze 
the null hypothesis that the difference between Male & Female loan officer and Male & Male loan officer equals 
zero. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level and are reported in parentheses.*,**,*** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
  Regression model     
Independent variable I II III IV 
Female & Female loan officer -0.0077** -0.0092**  -0.0236*** -0.0187**  
  (0.0025) (0.0035)    (0.0076) (0.0078)    
Male & Female loan officer 0.0285 0.0422    -0.0176 -0.0340    
  (0.0645) (0.0457)    (0.0551) (0.0384)    
Male & Male loan officer 0.0330 0.0603    0.0052 -0.0134    
  (0.0663) (0.0587)    (0.0677) (0.0461)    
Duration relationship -0.0028*** -0.0049*** -0.0615*** -0.0428*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009)    (0.0084) (0.0068)    
Any previous application rejected 0.0129*** 0.0173***   
   (0.0050) (0.0042)      
 Any previous loan in arrears > 30 days 0.1671*** 0.2161*** 0.1545*** 0.1672*** 
  (0.0427) (0.0307)    (0.0323) (0.0283)    
          
Wald test (for male borrowers)         
Male & Female loan officer versus -0.0045 -0.0181*** -0.0228*** -0.0206*** 
Male & Male loan officer 0.1682  0.0097 0.0060 0.0043 
p-value         
          
Observations 6,375 12,538 8,061 14,017 
Country Albania Albania Bolivia Bolivia 
Sample Repeat&last All repeat Repeat&last All repeat 
Socio-demographic control variables Yes No Yes No 
Full set of further baseline control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All control variables*Female Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
51 
Table V. Alternative performance measures and loan officer gender 
This table contains Tobit regression results for the baseline samples of borrowers from Albania (models I and II) and 
Bolivia (III and IV). The dependent variable is the ratio of realized payments over scheduled payments. We use two 
different versions of this variable: Rec1 equals the Sum of capital repayments / Approved loan amount, Rec2 is 
calculated as (Sum of capital & interest (re)payments) / (Approved loan amount & Sum of scheduled interest 
payments). Rec1 and Rec2 are both truncated at 1. The sample sizes are slightly reduced because of data availability 
for these alternative performance measures. All control variables and interaction terms are as in Table III and are 
omitted from the table. The combination Female & Male loan officer serves as the reference group. A Wald test is 
used to analyze the null hypothesis that the difference between Male & Female loan officer and Male & Male loan 
officer equals zero. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Performance measure     
Independent variable Rec1 Rec2 Rec1 Rec2 
Female & Female loan officer 0.2504*** 0.2172*** 0.3273*** 0.2734*** 
  (0.0834) (0.0716)    (0.0668) (0.0583)    
Male & Female loan officer 0.0754 -0.0214    0.5250* 0.4267*   
  (0.9250) (0.8028)    (0.3117) (0.2555)    
Male & Male loan officer -0.0229 -0.1187    0.1679 0.1296    
  (0.9171) (0.7964)    (0.3050) (0.2497)    
          
Wald test (for male borrowers)         
Male & Female loan officer versus         
Male & Male loan officer 0.0983** 0.0973** 0.3571*** 0.2971*** 
p-value 0.0428 0.0274 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
          
Observations 6,773 6,773 7,750 7,750 
Country Albania Albania Bolivia Bolivia 
Sample First&last First&last First&last First&last 
Full set of baseline control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Table VI. Test for differences in screening for Albanian borrowers 
This table contains the marginal effects for a test whether female and male loan officers experience screening 
differences for Albanian borrowers. The Probit regression models are based on different sub samples of loan 
applications: model I is based on 8,187 loan applications that are at the same time first and last applications per 
borrower; model II uses 15,857 first loan applications; model III employs 7,590 loan applications that are at the same 
time repeat and last applications per borrower; model IV is based on 14,763 repeat loan applications. The dependent 
variable is the approval decision (1 for an approved loan, 0 otherwise). The combination Female & Male loan officer 
serves as the reference group. A Wald test is used to analyze the null hypothesis that the difference between Male & 
Female loan officer and Male & Male loan officer equals zero. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level 
and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Regression model 
Independent variable I II III IV 
Female & Female loan officer 0.0109 0.0033 -0.0103 -0.0059 
  (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.0162) (0.0129) 
Male & Female loan officer 0.0229 0.0222 -0.0107 0.0629 
  (0.0888) (0.0441) (0.0997) (0.0572) 
Male & Male loan officer 0.0079 0.0151 0.0034 0.0705 
  (0.0893) (0.0422) (0.0920) (0.0467) 
          
Wald test (for male borrowers)         
Male & Female loan officer versus         
Male & Male loan officer 0.0150 0.0071 -0.0141* -0.0076** 
p-value 0.1961 0.3700 0.0983 0.0320 
          
Observations 8,187 15,827 7,590 14,763 
Country Albania Albania Albania Albania 
Sample First&last All first Repeat&last All repeat 
Socio-demographic control variables Yes No Yes No 
Full set of further baseline control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan history & duration control variables No No Yes Yes 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Table VII. Test for differences in workload of female and male loan officers 
This table contains the results of a test for differences in the workload of female and male loan officers. We measure the workload in terms of the handled 
approved loans (columns 1 to 4) and loan applications (columns 5 to 8) by male respectively female loan officers in different time intervals. For example, male 
loan officers handled 19.0 loan applications in their first year at the Albanian bank whereas female loan officers processed 18.4 loan applications, on average. The 
comparison is based on all loans in the sample, regardless of whether any information for the control variables used in the other analyses was available or not. 
Panel A provides results for Albanian borrowers. We restrict the analysis to the 141 loan officers included in the baseline regression of column 2 in Table III. 
Panel B provides results for Bolivian approved loans. We restrict the analysis to the 195 loan officers included in the baseline regression of column 6 in Table III. 
Note that the maximum number of years a loan officer worked for the Bolivian lender is capped at three years because our data starts in 2004. Loan application 
data is not available for Bolivia. One-sided p-values are provided for a standard t-test for differences between the workloads. 
 
Panel A: Albania 
Time a loan officer Average number of approved loans   One-sided   Average number of loan applications   One-sided 
works for the bank Male loan officer Female loan officer Difference p-value   Male loan officer Female loan officer Difference p-value 
Up to 1 year 14.8 13.8 1.0 0.362   19.0 18.4 0.6 0.447 
Up to 2 years 59.0 52.2 6.8 0.253   71.9 71.1 0.8 0.475 
Up to 3 years 122.4 117.3 5.2 0.401   148.5 155.6 -7.1 0.617 
Up to 4 years 195.0 172.4 22.6 0.221   242.8 230.0 12.9 0.347 
Up to 5 years 226.1 197.6 28.5 0.197   288.6 269.2 19.5 0.303 
Up to 6 years 228.1 205.6 22.4 0.258   292.8 283.1 9.7 0.402 
Maximum 228.1 207.8 20.2 0.281   292.8 286.2 6.6 0.435 
 
Panel B: Bolivia 
Time a loan officer Average number of approved loans   One-sided 
works for the bank Male loan officer Female loan officer Difference p-value 
Up to 1 year 16.9 23.8 -6.9 0.062 
Up to 2 years 86.5 101.5 -15.0 0.156 




Table VIII. Arrear probability and loan officer gender – interaction with experience 
This table contains the marginal effects of the outcome test with the gender of borrowers and loan officers together 
with interactions with loan officer experience. Probit model I is based on the 6,775 baseline loans from Albania, 
corresponding to the baseline regression of column 2 in Table III, while model II uses the 7,772 baseline loans from 
Bolivia (column 8 of Table III). The dependent variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more 
than 30 days at least once over the whole lifetime of her loan (1 if arrears > 30 days, 0 otherwise). In addition to the 
independent variables of Table III, we interact the borrower/loan officer gender pairs with the loan officer’s 
experience that is approximated by the number of loan applications handled by the respective loan officer until a 
certain loan was granted. The combination Female & Male loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer serves as 
the reference group. The first Wald test is used to analyze the null hypothesis that the difference between Male & 
Female loan officer and Male & Male loan officer equals zero. The second Wald test is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the difference between Male & Female loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer and Male & 
Male loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer equals zero. Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer 
level and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Regression model 
Independent variable I II 
Female & Female loan officer -0.0522**  -0.1242*** 
  (0.0187)    (0.0351)    
Male & Female loan officer 0.2297    -0.2473*   
  (0.3032)    (0.1133)    
Male & Male loan officer 0.2649    -0.1970    
  (0.3542)    (0.1370)    
Female & Female loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer 0.0250    -0.0562    
  (0.0872)    (0.0916)    
Male & Female loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer -0.0684    -0.1952**  
  (0.0908)    (0.0974)    
Male & Male loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer 0.1110    0.0451    
  (0.0812)    (0.0445)    
Loan applications per loan officer -0.0207    0.0734    
  (0.0733)    (0.0731)    
      
Wald tests (for male borrowers)     
Male & Female loan officer versus     
Male & Male loan officer -0.0352 -0.0503* 
p-value 0.6235  0.0726 
      
Male & Female loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer versus     
Male & Male loan officer*Loan applications per loan officer -0.1794*** -0.2403*** 
p-value 0.0008  0.0094 
      
Observations 6,775 7,772 
Country Albania Bolivia 
Sample First&last First&last 
Full set of baseline control variables Yes Yes 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes 





Table IX. Legal status and loan officer gender for Albanian borrowers 
This table contains the marginal effects for a test whether the loan officers monitor differently with respect to the legal status of the borrower using the Albanian 
dataset. The first three columns show the results of Probit regressions for three subsamples of loans granted to legal entities. The first column contains the results 
for first and at the same time last loans to legal entities, the second column for all first and the third column for all loans to legal entities. Columns 4-6 show 
results of Probit regressions for the same subsamples of loans for natural entities. The dependent variable is the occurrence of a borrower being in arrears for more 
than 30 days during the lifetime of her loan (1 if arrears > 30 days, 0 otherwise). Since we cannot observe the gender of the legal entities, we cannot use our 
borrower-loan officer gender combinations, but rather only use the dummy indicating the loan officer gender (and the borrower gender for columns 4 to 6). 
Standard errors are clustered at the loan officer level and are reported in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  Legal entities     Natural entities   
Independent variable First & last All first All   First & last All first All 
Female loan officer 0.0032 0.0166 0.0016   -0.0456*** -0.0291*** -0.0208*** 
  (0.0121) (0.0164) (0.0138)   (0.0152) (0.0103) (0.0066)    
Female         -0.1631 -0.1169 -0.0885**  
          (0.1023) (0.0562) (0.0286)    
                
Observations 213 452 1,209   6,775 14,003 26,541 
Country Albania Albania Albania   Albania Albania Albania 
Socio-demographic control variables No No No   Yes Yes Yes 
Full set of further baseline control variables Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Sector*Branch, Loan destination fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
All control variables*Female No No No   Yes Yes Yes 
 
56 
Appendix AI. Sample characteristics for Bolivian borrowers 
This table contains borrower, loan, and loan officer characteristics for 7,772 approved loans from the Bolivian lender 
used in the baseline analysis. The table includes the first and last loan for each borrower. We further drop loans with 
unreasonable entries for the borrower’s age (smaller than 18 or larger than 75 years), missing gender information for 
borrower and loan officer, and unreasonable entries for applied loan size (smaller than 100 or larger than 100,000 
USD). The first column provides the means for all loans, while column 2 (3) provides the means for female (male) 
loan officers only. Arrear is a dummy variable indicating whether a borrower was in arrears for more than 30 days at 
least once over the whole lifetime of the loan, Female is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the borrower 
(female = 1), Female loan officer is a dummy variable indicating the gender of the loan officer (female = 1), Loan 
applications per loan officer is a loan officer experience proxy indicating the number of loan applications handled by 
the loan officer until the respective loan was granted, divided by 1,000, Age of loan officer is the age of the loan 
officer at the time the loan was granted measured in years, Age of borrower is the age of the borrower at the time of 
the loan application, Civil status is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower is married (married = 1), Wage 
earner is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower is self-employed or at least partly an employed wage 
earner (wage earner = 1), Number persons household indicates how many persons including the borrower are in the 
household of the borrower, and Borrower lives in La Paz is a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower lives 
in or outside La Paz (in La Paz = 1). Leverage (total liabilities over total assets), Cash over assets, Total assets (in 
USD), and Business profits (monthly, in USD) are taken from the borrowers’ financial statements. Applied amount is 
the loan size applied for by the borrower in US dollars while Applied maturity is the loan maturity in days the 
borrower applied for. Results for the lender’s bank branches, the loan destinations, and the borrowers’ business 
sectors are omitted from the table to save space. The phone availability proxy is also omitted because all borrowers 
had a phone in the sample period. 
 
  Mean | Loan officer gender         
Variable All Female Male SD 5% Median 95% 
Arrear (30 days) 0.304 0.236 0.361 0.460       
Female borrower 0.508 0.499 0.515 0.500       
Loan officer characteristics               
Female loan officer 0.454 1.000 0.000 0.498       
Loan applications per loan officer 0.384 0.363 0.402 0.299 0.025 0.340 0.936 
Age of loan officer 30 29 31 4 24 29 39 
Borrower characteristics               
Age of borrower 38 39 37 11 23 36 59 
Civil status 0.396 0.404 0.389 0.489       
Wage earner 0.046 0.049 0.044 0.210       
Number persons household  2.396 2.339 2.443 1.463 1.000 2.000 5.000 
Borrower lives in La Paz 0.635 0.735 0.552 0.481       
Business characteristics               
Leverage 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cash over assets 0.249 0.275 0.228 0.333 0.004 0.090 1.000 
Total assets 6.578 7.333 5.950 19.062 0.089 1.520 26.795 
Business profits 0.150 0.162 0.140 0.402 -0.109 0.135 0.595 
Loan characteristics               
Applied amount 1,355 1,384 1,331 2,832 124 600 4,999 
Applied maturity 192 170 210 306 30 30 720 
 
 
